EACS-2016. Book of Abstracts

Politics & International Relations 21st Biennial Conference of the European Association for Chinese Studies 166 economic prospect. South Korea-China relations are “now at the best state in history”. North Korea’s new leader Kim Jong-un pursued a more assertive foreign and security policy, thereby isolating North Korea further. North Korea’s isolated in the region since its 2013 nuclear test. North Korea had detonated a nuclear bomb, and the president of China was urging caution. North Korea has grown closer to another Asia power Russia. China has tried to “break the ice” with North Korea, while getting closer to South Korea and the United States to ensure denuclearization of the Peninsula. South Korea’s president, Park Geun-hye, who has cultivated closer ties to Mr. Xi, called on China to match its disapproving words about the North’s nuclear ambitions with “necessary measures.” Now, we are witnessing a possible transition in China’s North Korea policy. Unintended consequence of North Korea’s brinkmanship policy has been the discourse on the estab- lishment of United States THAAD on South Korean soil. That has made China the biggest stakeholder in North Korea’s nuclear tests. Indisputably, further nuclear ambitions by Kim Jong-un will create the required political atmosphere in Seoul and. That will leave China with a weaker voice on THAAD deployments. After fourth North Korea’s nuclear test, researching China’s diplomatic policy changing on the two Koreas is one of extraordinary valuable studying for determining the future political power transition and structure of Northeast Asia. Lai Hongyi (Harry) (University of Nottingham) China’s Initiatives in Global Governance and International Responses — The Case of the Asian Infrastructural Investment Bank (AIIB) Key words: China, international, domestic, political economy, global governance China has been widely viewed as the up-and-coming superpower. Yet recent scholarly studies (such as Shambaugh 2013) suggested that its role in global go governance has been limited. These studies have yet to heed China’s recent and audacious efforts to shape global governance and offer an in-depth analysis of the domestic factors behind China’s initiative and the varying international responses. In 2013 President Xi Jinping proposed the Asian Infrastructural Investment Bank (AIIB) in order to finance the development of infrastructure linking up China to Europe on land and through sea lanes. China’s proposal of the AIIB has provoked mixed reactions. As of June 2015 57 countries and entities had become Prospective Founding Members (PFMs) of the Bank. Yet the U.S., Japan and Canada did not apply. In this paper I will study the domestic and external causes of China’s initiatives for the AIIB, and those of the varied responses from three major players regarding the AIIB, namely and tentatively, the UK, Kazakhstan (both of which applied to join), and Japan. These domestic factors include top leaders’ policy priority, process of policy making and debates, and the benefits or losses for relevant economic sectors. Possible external factors include alliance or rivalry politics, potential economic benefits such as trade and foreign investment, and the view of the elites toward China’s rise. To aid the analyses I will collect news and institutional reports, policy documents and announcements by the government, as well as statistics and published analyses. This project will be one of the earliest studies of the AIIB, the boldest China’s moves so far in shaping global governance. This study will address the question whether China is still a partial power in global gov- ernance. I aim to enhance our understanding of the domestic and international political economy regarding China’s role in the global order. Lavicka Martin (Palacký University Olomouc) Folklorization as a PRC's Strategy to Deal with the “Xinjiang Problem” Key words: Xinjiang, Uyghurs, ethnic minorities, folklorization, Chinese minority politics, ethnic policy Although the PRC is vehemently declaring that all of the 55 officially recognized minorities live happily and peacefully together under the guidance of the CCP, the reality is more complicated and less peaceful as it may seem from the official proclamations and the media coverage.