EACS-2016. Book of Abstracts

Section 14 21st Biennial Conference of the European Association for Chinese Studies 165 access to the Arctic, as state-to-state level cooperation has proved out unproductive for various reasons. These reasons include the historically tense relations between national governments and the strong role of nationalism in Northeast Asia. Furthermore, China’s status as a mere observer member of the Arctic Council means that it has no voting rights and it is thus excluded from the ultimate decision-making process of the Arctic. Interestingly enough, the implementation of such a strategy also intensifies the process of regionalism in Northeast Asia, an area into which Russia has become more integrated after the Western sanctions. As such, the paper places itself within the subnational turn in comparative politics. It brings fresh per- spectives to the study of new regionalism, as it focuses on the role and leeway of local governments and state-owned enterprises as agents of regionalism. This is particularly interesting in the light of an emerging trend in China’s political economy: a major reform of state-owned enterprises towards a more business- driven direction. The paper also joins the “Rising China” debate by shedding light on the nature of China’s access into a new arena of politics. Finally, it touches upon the debate whether regionalism is a force that promotes globalisation or disintegrates the international system. Kawashima Shin (University of Tokyo) Images of World Order in Modern China: From the Late Empire to the Nanjing Government Key words: tribute relations, modern diplomacy, imperialism, Nationalist Party, mass media This presentation explores the changing perception of world order among intellectuals and officials in China from the late 19th century to the 1930s. The focus is set on the images of ‘traditional’ tribute relations with surrounding countries. In the 1890s, Kang Youwei and other intellectuals proposed a new concept of world order, called ‘parallel relations of countries (Lieguo Bingli)’, instead of ‘China-centered international relations (Yitong Chuichang).’After the Waiwupu (Ministry of ForeignAffairs) was founded under the Guangxu New Policy in 1901, the Qing government adopted the style of modern diplomacy, instead of the double standard of tribute relations and modern diplomacy. The images of world order held by so called ‘Young China’ and new diplomats in Republican China were basically the same as the Western ones, but some intellectuals and politicians evaluated the past tribute relations higher than West- ern imperialism, and a few intellectuals claimed that past tribute countries must be part of the Chinese territory even in the 20th century. In the latter 1920s and in the 1930s, when the Guomindang formally described the ‘Three Principles of the People’, it criticized and denied the arguments which highly evalu- ated the tribute relations, and combined tribute relations and territorial concept. However, such official interpretations did not prevail overall in the mass media, such as magazines and newspapers. Sources examined bring evidence that the discourse on world order in Republican China was more complex than generally acknowledged, as the Guomindang did not manage to impose on society a unified vision of international relations. Kim Jim Ho (Dankook University) China’s Reorientation of a Foreign Policy toward the Two Koreas Key words: China’s diplomatic policy, NortheastAsia, Two Koreas, North Korea’s nuclear test, Power transition, South Korea, United States The geopolitics of NortheastAsia have been more fluid nowadays due to China’s rising and North Korea’s nuclear development. China’s rise today offers new challenge in Asia. The outstanding question is about the nature of Chinese ambitions in the region and beyond. China’s reorientation of a foreign policy has character- ized its direct Northeast Asian environment from Xi Jin-ping Era. And ties between China and South Korea warmed up quickly under Park Geun-hye. Chinese strategic concerns with South Korea are primarily based on South Korea’s alliance relationship with the United States and US-China relations. Also, South Korean strategic concerns with China are primarily based on China’s alliance relationship with North Korea and its